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
20 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Letter to The Chairman
Nat Evaluations Subcommittee

In support of recommendations set forth in my letter reporting the developments in the H.E.R.C. Meeting on Procedure on 10 June, I submit the attached proposed memorandum for your signature.

S/



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22 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman
Net Evaluations Subcommittee

SUBJECT: N.E.S.C. Procedures and Progress

As a follow-up of the Net Evaluations Subcommittee meeting held in your office on 10 June, I suggest that when you speak to the President concerning modification of NSC 5511 this year you indicate your continuing support of a realistic annual evaluation on the basis of the second situation (with warning estimated to be most likely) now included in the permanent procedure.

It is my view that although a sort of maximum and minimum assessment of damage that may result under assumed (1) complete surprise, and (2) no surprise conditions, may reasonably satisfy the needs of such agencies as OPM or FCDA for planning purposes, the national government has a need to know the best possible realistic appraisal of what are most likely to be the circumstances under which we must plan for the attainment of our national objectives.

It is my judgement that a realistic and sound net estimate of the probable threat should be prepared periodically and that it can be obtained only by the continued cooperative effort of the Defense Department with the Joint Chiefs of Staff representing operational judgements and the Central Intelligence Agency in its field of intelligence representing the views of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

This point is made to urge that the permanent procedure set forth in NSC 5511 remain as stated although I recognize circumstances require its modification this year.

In addition, I believe it desirable to insure that the procedure used by the Staff in making the two remaining evaluations based on assumptions should result in adopting Soviet plans of attack which are realistic to the extent of being compatible with agreed estimates. Location and capacities of base areas, routes of approach and the desired timing and magnitude of various attacks designed to maximize damage sometimes conflict with factors essential to secure surprise; hence a balance must be struck to determine the most likely action.

I also recommend that the Chairman arrange a briefing for the Subcommittee to present the conditions arrived at through steps 4, 5 and 6 of the Staff's proposed procedure (capabilities, target systems, attack plans, etc.) in order that the Subcommittee members may pass judgement before the Staff Director undertakes steps 7 and 8 (the actual plan of attack and net evaluation) and the final war gaming procedures involved therein.

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HENRY W. HOLMES
Director

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22 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NESC Meeting On Procedure

1. At the call of the Chairman the NESC met as scheduled in the Office of the Chairman, JCS at 1430 and adjourned at 1450, 10 June.

2. The following were present: Admiral Radford, General Cabell, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Yeagley, Mr. Fleming, Mr. Magruder, General George, Colonel Watson (Joint Staff), [] (with General Cabell). Mr. Peterson (FCDA) was enroute to the meeting but his plane was delayed.

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3. The Chairman stated in substance: (a) That the meeting was called to check on progress to date and on the procedures as outlined in enclosure 1 of General George's 23 May letter, (b) That the plan (Enclosure 3) previously circulated was withdrawn because it contained much more very sensitive information than was needed by all recipients and that portions of the correspondence needed by each sub-committee member would be despatched to them later in keeping with their individual needs.

4. The Chairman stated he was convinced that the separate services could not war game the proposed plan A independently as proposed by General George and that the plan when ready would be war gamed at the Air University with appropriate service representation.

5. Mr. Fleming and General Cabell noted that General George's letter with all enclosures had been returned as directed and only a hasty reading of enclosure 1 had been possible. The Chairman stated (and Mr. Magruder concurred) that enclosure 1 would be despatched again to each member.

6. The Chairman stated that the procedure as outlined by General George seemed satisfactory to him and if there was no objection it would be accepted.

7. General Cabell stated that he was concerned that time seemed to be inadequate to do the job thoroughly with the necessary war gaming.

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8. The Chairman noting NSC 5511, the charter for the NESC, stated he didn't see how all the war gaming involved in producing the three net evaluations required could be completed by 1 October nor did he see the real need for doing all three exercises: (1) with no strategic warning, (2) with warning estimated to be most likely and (3) with warning giving US Forces and defense full alert. He thought that what we wanted to know was the maximum damage and the minimum damage that we might suffer in 1958. In the general discussion on this point Mr. Fleming (with Mr. Hoover and Mr. Yeagley nodding agreement) indicated that this would satisfy his requirements and he did not see the need for the second evaluation. The Chairman stated that he intended to verify with the President the decision to skip the second evaluation and suggested that in the meantime the sub-committee proceed with the objective of completing the first evaluation (no strategic warning) by 1 October and if possible also complete the third evaluation (full US alert) by that deadline date.

9. General Cabell pointed out however, that although CIA would not require the product of an evaluation based upon assumption 2 (the most likely) he thought that other governmental agencies would require it, hence evaluation based upon assumption 2 eventually should be made. The decision reference the second evaluation (most likely strategic warning) was deferred. The arrangements concerning the three evaluations were accepted by the sub-committee members present.

10. General Cabell asked if there were contemplated any additional requirements on the member agencies and General George said that there were none but that he seemed to have all that he needs.

11. The meeting adjourned with no further action.

12. Comments:

a. I feel sure that with full utilization of the time between now and 1 October no more than situations 1 and 3 as now decided upon could be completed. My judgment says that there is a very strong likelihood that only the first situation (no warning) can be done with reasonably acceptable thoroughness.

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b. It may be true that situations 1 and 3 properly evaluated would give the NSC and some interested agencies a sound picture of maximum and minimum damage to be expected from attack in 1958 but they are based on assumptions neither one of which can be taken as completely realistic in 1958. The bracket may be acceptable even though the damage conclusions may be far apart. This result may however generate in the minds of some agency chiefs a demand for a more realistic "net" estimate based on most likely US and USSR capabilities and reflecting agreed intelligence as to how the USSR would be most likely to attack in order to get the optimum benefits in surprise and weight of attack.

13. Recommendations

a. I believe the DCI should accept the decision for this year in view of the set-up and time limitations as they now are.

b. On the other hand the DCI should take a strong position that the procedure directed in NSC 5511 be carried through with the purpose of seeking annual evaluations of the more realistic threat to the US determined only after the most thorough study and evaluation of all that we know or estimate concerning the USSR and the USA and their power positions in the world. Such an evaluation was contemplated I believe by the second situation in NSC 5511 which has now been or may be discarded.

c. In accepting the change in charter to require only two evaluations based on different warning assumptions, I believe you should point out to the Chairman that even though we are going ahead on this basis, the staff in its approach to the problem should devise Soviet plans of attack which are realistic to the extent of being compatible with agreed estimates. Location and capacity of base areas, and the desired size and timing of various attacks designed to maximize damage sometimes conflict with factors essential to secure surprise.

concur
C.P. Cabell

DDCI

23 JUN 1955



National Estimates

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	General Cabell	<i>CC</i>	<i>19 June</i>
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	General Bull		
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL	☐ INFORMATION	☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION	☐ DIRECT REPLY	☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT	☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY	☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE	☐ RECOMMENDATION	☐ FILE

REMARKS:
I have left off signature thinking you might wish to sign yourself. If not I shall do so after making any corrections or additions you may desire.

- over -

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*Request you put
both documents into
final form (m/R for
your sig + G'el initial).*

*Return to me + we'll
then make appointment
with DCI*

ck

Gen. Cabell:

is returning these documents in
accordance with your instructions.

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